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ABSTRACT
This paper investigates the extent to which the theory of corrective
justice can account for the purpose, structure, and elements of the tort
of unlawful interference with economic relations. It considers various
proposed accounts of the tort, contending that the tort cannot be
justified as an exception to the privity doctrine, a response to the
defendant’s attempts to assert indirect control over the plaintiff, or a
form of liability stretching. Extending a proposed account of the tort
based on the theory of abuse of rights, this paper develops the idea of
a “right to trade” that is founded on the conception of rights, remedies,
and the systematicity of the legal order underlying corrective justice.
The right to trade expresses each person’s equal opportunity to
transact with others as abstract, self-determining beings in an
omnilateral structure of relations—a juridical conception of the
market. The paper argues that the unlawful means tort serves to
protect this right, which is correlative to a duty on everyone not to
interfere with the plaintiff’s equal status as a participant in the market.
This conception of the tort provides a coherent account of its main
features and situates it within the overall theory of corrective justice.
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INTRODUCTION
Since the trilogy of cases launched by Mogul Steamship, a coherent, principled
theory of the economic torts has eluded courts and commentators alike.1 In
recent years, these torts have attracted critical attention due to their increasing use
by litigants, especially in the context of market competition.2 The theoretical
controversy surrounding this genus of torts has persisted alongside influential
articulations of what is perhaps the most illuminating standpoint on private law—
the theory of corrective justice.3 The goal of this paper is to investigate the extent
to which this theory can account for one such tort, specifically the tort of unlawful
interference with economic relations. I argue that despite its apparent
inconsistencies with the bilateral, correlative framework that the theory posits,
the tort can be justified as an expression of the idea of systematicity immanent in
corrective justice. This conception of the tort provides a coherent account of its
main features and situates it within the overall theory of corrective justice.
Section I of this paper describes the tort of unlawful interference with
economic relations, also known as the “unlawful means” tort, and the difficulties
it raises for the corrective justice approach. Section II canvasses proposed
justifications of the purpose, structure, and elements of this tort. From a
corrective justice perspective, I argue, the tort cannot be explained as (1) an
exception to the privity doctrine, (2) a response to the defendant’s attempts to
assert ‘indirect control’ over the plaintiff, or (3) a form of ‘liability stretching’.
Section III considers another compelling proposal: that the tort is a manifestation
of the doctrine of abuse of rights. I contend that this proposal is incomplete in
an important respect. It casts the right protected by the unlawful means tort as a
premise to practical reasoning, rather than as a conclusion. What is needed is a
specification of the form and content of the right-duty relationship that inheres
in the tort.
Mogul Steamship Co Ltd v McGregor, Gow & Co, [1892] AC 25 (HL (Eng)) [Mogul Steamship]; Allen v Flood,
[1898] AC 1 (HL (Eng)); Quinn v Leathem, [1901] AC 495 (HL (Eng)). See Peter T Burns & Joost Blom,
Economic Torts in Canada, 2nd ed (Canada: LexisNexis Canada Inc, 2016) at §1.89; Hazel Carty, An Analysis of
the Economic Torts, 2nd ed (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010) [Analysis].
2 Hazel Carty, “The Modern Functions of the Economic Torts: Reviewing the English, Canadian, Australian,
and New Zealand Positions” (2015) 74:2 Camb LJ 261 at 264 [“Modern Functions”].
3 Christopher Essert, “Thinking Like a Private Lawyer” (2018) 68:1 UTLJ 166 at 185.
1
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In Section IV, I elaborate on the “abuse of right” proposal by drawing on
the notion of “public right” as developed by theorists of corrective justice. Within
the condition of public right, the norms of corrective justice are secured through
public institutions that relate persons to each other under a system of laws. I argue
that the form of the right protected by the unlawful means tort is the plaintiff’s
“right to trade,” which is correlative to a duty on everyone not to infringe a status
conferred upon the plaintiff. The content of the right to trade, I claim, is each
person’s equal opportunity to transact with others as abstract, self-determining
beings in an omnilateral structure of relations—a juridical conception of the
market. Section V applies this theory to the unlawful means tort and discusses its
implications for the elements of the tort. The paper concludes that the unlawful
means tort can, in fact, be reconciled with the corrective justice approach to
private law.

CORRECTIVE JUSTICE AND THE ECONOMIC TORTS
The Framework of Corrective Justice
Corrective justice is arguably the most prominent non-instrumentalist
approach to the understanding of Anglo-American private law today. As
described by some of its leading proponents, the theory of corrective justice is an
account of “the relational structure of reasoning in private law.” 4 In contrast to
instrumentalist or policy-based accounts, the central claim of the theory is that
the Aristotelian ideal of corrective justice, along with a conception of abstract
right as the normative basis of relations between persons, provides a coherent
explanation for the features of private law.5 As the Supreme Court of Canada has
recognized, corrective justice is an underlying idea that animates private law. 6 In
Ernest J Weinrib, Corrective Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) at 2 [CJ]; Ernest J Weinrib, The
Idea of Private Law, revised ed (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) at ch 3 [IPL]; Arthur Ripstein, Private
Wrongs (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2016) at 4 [PW]. See also Ernest J Weinrib, “Corrective Justice
in a Nutshell” (2002) 52 UTLJ 349 at 351 [“Nutshell”].
5 Ernest J Weinrib, IPL, supra note 4 at 18-19.
6 Kingstreet Investments Ltd v New Brunswick (Department of Finance), 2007 SCC 1 at para 32; Clements
v Clements, 2012 SCC 32 at para 7; Rankin (Rankin’s Garage & Sales) v JJ, 2018 SCC 19 at para 63. See also
Whiten v Pilot Insurance Co, 2002 SCC 18 at para 152, LeBel J; Kazemi Estate v Islamic Republic of Iran,
2014 SCC 62 at para 189, Abella J.
4
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this paper, I refer to corrective justice not simply in terms of the definition of the
form of its relational structure, but also as encompassing the theory’s account of
the substantive content of this structure.7
The “paradigmatic and central form” of corrective justice’s reasoning has
been described as the idea of “correlativity,” “bipolarity,” or “bilaterality.” 8 This
idea encapsulates the understanding of private law as embodying “a correlative or
relational form of normativity,” in that the law conceptualizes the parties as doer
and sufferer of the same injustice.9 Applied to tort law, a key normative claim
flowing from this thesis is that liability responds to a private wrong, understood
as the defendant’s infringement of the plaintiff’s right. That is, the plaintiff’s
normative loss is matched by the defendant’s equivalent normative gain.10 Both
sides of the transaction are related to each other on this account, such that the
remedy provided by tort law “consists not in two independent operations . . . but
in a single operation that joins the parties as obligee and obliger.”11
Under the corrective justice framework, the concept of “personality”
represents the “normative standpoint” that articulates the regime of rights and
duties implicit in private law.12 Private law conceptualizes persons as notionally
equal in the sense that each possesses an abstract personality. The equality
conferred by this juridical understanding of personality is the normative baseline
that defines when an injustice has occurred.13 The most prominent accounts of
this theory posit the Kantian14 and Hegelian15 conception of rights and juridical
personality as substantiating the normative standpoint appropriate to corrective
justice. On this view, a private law right is the “juridical manifestation of a
person’s freedom with respect to the actions of another.” 16 These rights outline
Cf Stephen R Perry, “Loss, Agency, and Responsibility for Outcomes: Three Conceptions of Corrective
Justice” in Ken Cooper-Stephenson & Elaine Gibson, eds, Tort Theory (North York: Captus Press Inc, 1993)
24 at 24-25, 30-31 [“Conceptions”]; John Gardner, “What is Tort Law for? Part 1: The Place of Corrective
Justice” (2011) 30:1 Law & Phil 1 at 22-24.
8 Essert, supra note 3 at 167.
9 Ibid at 171; Weinrib, CJ, supra note 4 at 2.
10 Ripstein, PW, supra note 4 at 7.
11 Weinrib, IPL, supra note 4 at 143.
12 Weinrib, CJ, supra note 4 at 11-12.
13 Ibid at 16. See also Weinrib, “Nutshell,” supra note 4 at 349.
14 Weinrib, IPL, supra note 4 at ch 4.
15 See e.g. Peter Benson, “The Basis of Corrective Justice and Its Relation to Distributive Justice” (1992) 77:2
Iowa L Rev 515.
16 Weinrib, IPL, supra note 4 at 124.
7
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a particular conception of free and equal persons under private law, a feature of
which is indifference to a person’s internal “needs, wishes or advantage,” as
opposed to his or her “externally manifested choice.”17 Thus, corrective justice is
not merely the remedial idea that private law liability occurs when a right is
violated and a duty breached. Its conception of juridical personality posits, at an
abstract level, the content of those rights and duties.18 In what follows, I consider
the unlawful means tort and the problems it poses for this theory of private law.
The Tort of Unlawful Interference
Having been neglected for a number of years, the economic torts have
recently received high appellate treatment in England and Canada. In OBG Ltd v
Allan (“OBG”),19 the House of Lords reorganized these torts.20 Lord Hoffmann,
delivering the leading judgment, conspicuously rejected the “unified theory” of
the economic torts. Instead, he favoured a disaggregated approach that separated
the causes of action of inducing breach of contract and of unlawful interference
with economic relations.21 Unlike inducing breach of contract, the unlawful
means tort “is a tort of primary liability” rather than accessory liability. 22 The
House of Lords later confirmed this approach in relation to unlawful means
conspiracy in Revenue and Customs Commissioners v Total Network SL,23 which
clarified that the unlawful means tort and tort of conspiracy “are different in their
nature, and the interests of justice may require their development on somewhat
different bases.”24
This paper focuses on the “radically under-theorized” tort of unlawful
interference with economic relations.25 Limited to “a three-party setting,” the tort
Peter Benson, “Equality of Opportunity and Private Law” in Dan Friedmann & Daphne Barak-Erez, eds,
Human Rights in Private Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2001) 201 at 211 [“Equality of Opportunity”].
18 See Ripstein, PW, supra note 4 at 6-7.
19 [2007] UKHL 21, [2008] 1 AC 1 [OBG].
20 Roderick Bagshaw, “Lord Hoffmann and the Economic Torts” in Paul S Davies & Justine Pila, eds, The
Jurisprudence of Lord Hoffmann: A Festschrift in Honour of Lord Leonard Hoffmann (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2015)
59 at 59. See also Edwin Peel & James Goudkamp, eds, Winfield and Jolowicz on Tort, 19th ed (London, UK:
Sweet & Maxwell, 2014) at para 19-021 [Winfield & Jolowicz].
21 OBG, supra note 19 at para 32.
22 Ibid at para 8; Winfield & Jolowicz, supra note 20 at para 19-019.
23 [2008] UKHL 19, [2008] 1 AC 1174 [Total Network].
24 Ibid at para 123. See also ibid at paras 100, 223.
25 AI Enterprises Ltd v Bram Enterprises Ltd, 2014 SCC 12 at para 36 [AI Enterprises].
17
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imposes liability where the defendant has committed a wrong against a third party,
with the intention of harming the plaintiff.26 In OBG, Lord Hoffmann articulated
the elements of this tort:
The essence of this tort therefore appears to be (a) a wrongful
interference with the actions of a third party in which the
claimant has an economic interest and (b) an intention thereby
to cause loss to the claimant.27
First, the defendant must have employed “unlawful means” against a third
party, that is, a wrong that is “actionable by that third party.” 28 The defendant’s
act must interfere with “the freedom of a third party . . . to deal with the claimant,”29
or, in another formulation also adopted by Lord Hoffmann, with “the liberty of
action of a third party” in relation to the plaintiff.30 Second, the requisite intention
for the tort is satisfied where “[o]ne intends to cause loss even though it is the means
by which one achieved the end of enriching oneself,” but not where the loss was
“merely a foreseeable consequence of one’s actions.”31
Subsequently, this reorganization and the elements of the tort were largely
imported to Canada in AI Enterprises Ltd. v Bram Enterprises Ltd. (“AI Enterprises”).
The Supreme Court characterized the unlawful means tort as “parasitic”:
Liability to the plaintiff is based on (or parasitic upon) the
defendant’s unlawful act against the third party. While the
elements of the tort have been described in a number of ways,
its core captures the intentional infliction of economic injury on
C (the plaintiff) by A (the defendant)’s use of unlawful means
against B (the third party).32
Justice Cromwell, writing for the Court, agreed with Lord Hoffmann that the
“unlawful means” element is only satisfied where the defendant commits an
“actionable civil wrong” against the third party. 33 Declining to adopt the
Carty, Analysis, supra note 1 at 18.
OBG, supra note 19 at para 47.
28 Ibid at para 49.
29 Ibid at para 51 [emphasis added]. See also ibid at para 320.
30 Ibid at paras 48, 53 [emphasis added]. See also Bagshaw, supra note 20 at 63ff.
31 Ibid at para 62 [emphasis added].
32 AI Enterprises, supra note 25 at para 23.
33 Ibid at para 74.
26
27
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respondents’ submissions proposing a broader definition of an “unlawful”
means, he agreed with the House of Lords that it was inappropriate to “tortify”
criminal and regulatory law “by imposing civil liability where there would not
otherwise be any.”34
Notably, however, Cromwell J departed from OBG by dismissing the
requirement that the unlawful means “must interfere with the third party’s
freedom to deal with the plaintiff.”35 In his view, it was unnecessary to “resort to
this additional ‘freedom to deal’ qualification”:
Whether the unlawful means interfere with the plaintiff’s right
to deal with the injured third party or with some other party, the
fact that the defendant aims at the plaintiff provides a sufficient
nexus between the unlawful means and the interests of the
plaintiff to justify imposing liability.36
In part, this departure stemmed from Cromwell J’s view that the “best rationale”
for the tort is “liability stretching.”37 In his view, this rationale “sees the tort as
extending civil liability without creating new actionable wrongs” by “extending
an existing right to sue from the immediate victim of the unlawful act” to the
plaintiff targeted by the defendant.38
The Problems Posed for Corrective Justice
As articulated in OBG and AI Enterprises, the unlawful means tort appears
to pose three problems for corrective justice theory. First, the tort provides the
plaintiff standing to sue a defendant that committed an actionable wrong against
a third party, even though it is not immediately evident that the defendant has
breached a right of the plaintiff. Even if the defendant’s act causes a third party
to terminate its economic relationship with the plaintiff, one might object that
the third party’s free choice to do so cannot, in itself, generate liability by the

Ibid at paras 26, 45.
Ibid at para 87. See also Pey-Woan Lee, “The Unlawful Means Tort in Canada” (2014) 130 Law Q Rev 559
at 562.
36 Ibid.
37 Ibid at para 49.
38 Ibid at paras 37, 43.
34
35
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defendant to the plaintiff.39 Rather, some primary right must be identified in the
plaintiff.40 Otherwise, the tort would violate the basic principle of privity by
allowing the plaintiff to recover for a wrongful act suffered by a third party. 41 The
problem is compounded by the fact that the tort contemplates recovery for pure
economic loss.42 As a rights-based account of private law, corrective justice
requires the plaintiff to establish a juridical right vis-à-vis the defendant in order to
recover economic loss resulting from the latter’s interference with the right.43
However, a person “cannot have a possessory or property right in the continued
custom or business of others.”44 If such a right did exist, the perverse implication
would be that any market competition could attract liability.
Second, the role of the “unlawful means” element in Cromwell J’s
formulation of the tort is arguably inconsistent with the bilaterality of private law.
On the one hand, this element distinguishes the unlawful means tort from the
American “prima facie tort” developed in Tuttle v Buck.45 Unlike the AngloCanadian tort, the prima facie tort imposes liability for “intentionally causing
damage without using unlawful means,” unless the defendant’s act can be shown
to be justified.46 The corrective justice approach does not countenance this
imposition of liability, since it permits recovery for damnum absque injuria.47 On the
other hand, some commentators have criticized the unlawful means element as
“an arbitrary and illogical limit” on the development of the tort.48
In AI Enterprises, Cromwell J portrayed the unlawful means element as part
of “a sufficient nexus” that would “justify imposing liability” on the defendant.49
Peter Benson, “Misfeasance as an Organizing Normative Idea in Private Law” (2010) 60:3 UTLJ 731 at
741 [“Misfeasance”].
40 Allan Beever, A Theory of Tort Liability (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2016) at 137 [ATTL].
41 JW Neyers, “Rights-based justifications for the tort of unlawful interference with economic relations”
(2008) 28:2 LS 215 at 222 [“Rights-based justifications”].
42 JW Neyers, “The economic torts as corrective justice” (2009) 17 Torts LJ 162 at 166 [“Economic torts”].
See e.g. Hardie Finance Corp Pty Ltd v Ahern (No 3), [2010] WASC 403 at para 706 [Hardie].
43 Neyers, “Economic torts,” supra note 42 at 166; Peter Benson, “The Problem with Pure Economic Loss”
(2009) 60:4 SCL Rev 823 at 845.
44 Benson, “Misfeasance,” supra note 39 at 740.
45 Tuttle v Buck, 119 NW 949 (1909). See Carty, Analysis, supra note 1 at 84-85.
46 OBG, supra note 19 at para 145. See Restatement (Second) of Torts §§767-68 (1979).
47 “Loss or harm that is incurred from something other than a wrongful act and occasions no legal remedy.”
Bryan A Garner et al, eds, Black’s Law Dictionary, 10th ed (St. Paul, MN: Thomson Reuters, 2014) sub verbo
“damnum absque injuria.”
48 Tony Weir, Economic Torts (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997) at 21 n 1. See also ibid at para 146.
49 AI Enterprises, supra note 25 at para 87.
39
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Yet, that role is incompatible with corrective justice’s requirement of an
“articulated unity” of the plaintiff’s right and defendant’s duty, which unites the
parties in one moral transaction.50 On the logic of his analysis, the unlawful means
requirement seems to pertain only to the defendant’s side of the transaction. This
rationale is arguably inconsistent with the parties’ transactional equality. By
founding liability upon the defendant’s unlawful act, even if it is aimed at the
plaintiff, he refers to a merely factual and not juridical nexus between the parties.51
As Weinrib explains:
[It cannot be that] the entire justificatory weight of the
relationship rests on the reason for considering the defendant to
be under a duty; right is then immediately attributed to anyone
who would benefit from the performance of that duty.52
To be intelligible as an expression of corrective justice, the tort must be theorized
in a manner that accounts for how it protects “a person’s freedom with respect
to the actions of another.”53
Third, insofar as the existence and elements of the tort are justified as a
judicial instrument to prevent “excessive competitive conflict,”54 it raises
concerns about the extent to which a corrective justice approach can
accommodate distributive considerations. The regulation of commercial
behaviour is generally understood to be a question of the welfare of the
community as a whole. Such matters belong to distributive justice, a domain that
courts have traditionally avoided, particularly in the adjudication of private legal
disputes.55 For this reason, Lord Hoffmann cautioned that the tort “was designed
only to enforce basic standards of civilised behaviour in economic competition,
between traders or between employers and labour.”56 The concerns about the
appropriateness of common law tools in intervening in this area may be

Weinrib, IPL, supra note 4 at 123.
See ibid at 124-25.
52 Ibid at 124.
53 Ibid.
54 Carty, “Modern Functions,” supra note 2 at 277.
55 Ross Grantham & Darryn Jensen, “The Proper Role of Policy in Private Law Adjudication” (2018) 68:2
UTLJ 187 at 191, 198-201. See also Weinrib, IPL, supra note 4 at 210.
56 OBG, supra note 19 at para 56 [emphasis added].
50
51
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warranted.57 If the primary justification for this economic tort is a strictly
regulatory function, then it would be inappropriate from a corrective justice
perspective. In light of these observations, the next section of the paper considers
various proposed rationalizations of the unlawful means tort.

PROPOSED ACCOUNTS OF THE UNLAWFUL MEANS TORT
Principled Exceptions to the Privity Rule

In response to the observation that the tort does not appear to pertain to a
right of the plaintiff, two explanations have been advanced. Both of these
accounts can be broadly categorized as justifying the tort as an exception to the
privity rule in private law. Normally, the privity rule limits standing to sue to a
plaintiff whose right was violated.58 First, Robert Stevens has argued that an
exception to the rule “may be justified on the basis that it prevents [the defendant]
from using others as means to his own ends.”59 He argues that the unlawful means
tort is such an exception. Still, he maintains that “the general rule . . . discloses
the structure of the law of torts,” and he considers the tort to be unproblematic
because the defendant’s commission of an independently actionable wrong must
be established.60 Indeed, it might even be accepted that, as a descriptive matter,
the modern function of the unlawful means tort is to accommodate plaintiffs who
are harmed, but barred from recovery by the privity rule.61
Second, Daniel Stilitz and Philip Sales have advanced an alternative theory,
arguing that the defendant’s intention to harm the plaintiff “bridges the
remoteness of his unlawful actions.”62 Citing Lord Lindley’s opinion in Quinn v
Leathem, they claim that liability is imposed by virtue of this bridging mechanism:
the defendant’s intention to harm the plaintiff enables the latter “to overcome
the defence . . . that D’s unlawful conduct is remote from P.”63 According to their
See Hardie, supra note 42 at para 707. See also Carty, “Modern Functions,” supra note 2 at 283.
Robert Stevens, Torts and Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007) at 173.
59 Ibid at 188.
60 Ibid at 174, 188-89.
61 Carty, “Modern Functions,” supra note 2 at 277.
62 Daniel Stilitz & Philip Sales, “Intentional infliction of harm by unlawful means” (1999) 115 Law Q Rev
411 at 413.
63 Ibid at 412, citing Quinn v Leathem, supra note 1 at 534-35.
57
58
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“remoteness theory,” the plaintiff needs only to show that he or she suffered a
loss—has been “damaged in fact”—due to the defendant’s unlawful conduct
against the intermediary, including pure economic loss.64 The defendant’s
requisite state of mind must be “a strict one,” so that it is defensible to impose
liability “where none would otherwise be recognised by the law.”65 In other
words, Stilitz and Sales consider the intention element to be a “proximity
mechanism” that prevents liability from blooming in an undesirable manner.66 As
such, they conclude that it would suffice that the defendant’s “actuating intent”
or “purpose” was to cause harm to the plaintiff.67
These explanations, however, merely sidestep the question of the plaintiff’s
right that is central to a corrective justice account of the unlawful means tort.
Although Stevens aims to advance a rights-based theory of tort law, his account
focuses on the defendant’s wrongdoing and the third party victim, as opposed to
the plaintiff’s right.68 If his rationale were accepted, it would tend to undermine
the rights-based account altogether. In truth, the privity exception argument
amounts to the invocation of a “gap-filling” policy justification that imposes
liability because the plaintiff would otherwise have no legal recourse.69 It may be,
as Stevens suggests, that it is in the public interest to deter defendants from
“deliberately using others.”70 The privity exception he proposes effectively
deputizes a plaintiff to undertake the deterrence function by permitting him or
her to recover from the defendant. Nonetheless, it is less clear why a rights-based
account of tort law would countenance this explanation, given its inability to
identify a pre-existing legal right in the plaintiff exigible against the defendant.71
Meanwhile, Stilitz and Sales’ account explicitly embraces the gap-filling
justification. However, they take it for granted that the plaintiff simply has a legal
right not to suffer any pure economic loss that was factually caused by the
defendant. In so doing, they fail to justify this extension of liability to protect
Ibid at 413, 430-31.
Ibid at 430.
66 See Carty, Analysis, supra note 1 at 82.
67 Stilitz & Sales, supra note 62 at 427, 429.
68 See James Goudkamp & John Murphy, “The Failure of Universal Theories of Tort Law” (2015) 21:2 Legal
Theory 47 at 81, n 199
69 John Murphy, “Rights, Reductionism and Tort Law” (2008) 28:2 Oxford J Leg Stud 393 at 402.
70 Stevens, supra note 58 at 188.
71 Neyers, “Economic torts,” supra note 42 at 182.
64
65
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against instances of pure economic loss, despite the fact that Anglo-Canadian tort
law has “traditionally accorded less protection to purely economic interests than
to physical integrity and property rights.”72 It has been cogently argued that a right
not to suffer pure economic loss per se cannot be sustained at private law. One
reason for this conclusion is that it is impossible to determine what constitutes a
“loss” in the absence of injury to an underlying right, since whether an event has,
factually speaking, caused loss could change from moment to moment; an
apparent loss today could lead to a gain tomorrow.73
Likewise, the proposal that the defendant’s intention “bridges” the gap
attributes to the intention a normative role that is difficult to explain. It is
incompatible with bilaterality under corrective justice, for the thesis situates the
tort exclusively in the defendant’s side of the right-duty relationship. Moreover,
if intention is the operative proximity mechanism, then the additional
requirement of unlawful means would be otiose. 74 Still, in the face of strong
academic criticism, the courts have consistently maintained the “key ingredient”
of unlawful means.75 Thus, the remoteness-bridging theory suffers from
problems of both fit and coherence in accounting for the unlawful means tort.
Ultimately, both these proposed exceptions to privity are reducible to
consequentialist or loss-based considerations, rationales extrinsic to the
relationship between the parties that is central to corrective justice.76
Indirect Control

In a recent work, Allan Beever advances the novel thesis that the economic
torts, including the unlawful means tort, respond to an interpersonal wrong in the
defendant’s attempt to exert “indirect control” over the plaintiff through
coercion.77 His theory of tort, based on Kant’s philosophy of law, views such an
attempt as a violation of the plaintiff’s “innate right.”78 The Kantian innate right
refers to one’s external freedom, “insofar as it can coexist with the freedom of
AI Enterprises, supra note 25 at para 30.
Donal Nolan, “Rights, Damage and Loss” (2017) 37:2 Oxford J Leg Stud 255 at 262-66.
74 Neyers, “Economic torts,” supra note 42 at 181.
75 Carty, Analysis, supra note 1 at 102. See also Weir, supra note 48 at 73.
76 See Murphy, supra note 69 at 403.
77 Beever, ATTL, supra note 40 at 124.
78 Ibid.
72
73
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every other in accordance with a universal law.”79 In Beever’s view, the Kantian
conception of rights supports a person’s entitlement to be free from attempts by
other persons to gain power or control over his actions, whether directly or
indirectly. He contends that the “right to trade” referred to in the case law is an
instance of the Kantian innate right.80 On this account, the defendants in Allen v
Flood were not held liable because the defendant was not attempting to injure the
plaintiffs.81 The defendant’s actions were described in the subsequent case of
Quinn v Leathem as “simply warn[ing] the plaintiff’s employers” of the employee’s
intended actions.82 In contrast, Beever argues that the defendants in Quinn v
Leathem were held liable because they “were trying to strike at the plaintiff . . . to
control the way in which he ran his business.”83
Beever offers a rights-based account of the tort, which, as a Kantian theory,
appears to be compatible with the corrective justice framework. It asserts a
plausible basis for the plaintiff’s right, thereby avoiding the conclusion that the
plaintiff’s economic loss is damnum absque injuria. Nor does it advert to policy
justifications to sustain the tort: “[t]he wrong is not the causing of loss, it is
coercion.”84 The indirect control theory addresses a defect identified in Stilitz and
Sales’ remoteness theory, which effectively claimed that economic loss was per se
recoverable.
Grounded in the view that Kantian right includes a juridical immunity from
indirect control by others, the theory proposes some refinements to the current
model of the tort. One important implication is that the unlawful means element
is unnecessary for liability. Beever claims that this element is merely a “policybased control mechanism,” and that the requirement that a third party was
wronged creates a “logical chasm” between the plaintiff and defendant.85 In his
view, the parasitic nature of the tort is indefensible. Instead of conditioning the
plaintiff’s recovery on an actionable wrong to a third party, it should be
Ibid at 19-20. See Immanuel Kant, “The metaphysics of morals” in Mary J Gregor, ed, Practical Philosophy
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996) 353 at 6:237.
80 Ibid at 124-25.
81 Ibid at 127.
82 Quinn v Leathem, supra note 1 at 506.
83 Beever, ATTL supra note 40 at 128.
84 Ibid at 124.
85 Ibid at 134, 137.
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recognized that the relevant wrong simply is that suffered by the plaintiff.86 For
this reason, he favours reorienting the tort to focus on the defendant’s intention,
which he argues must be a purposive intention to exert “control” over the
plaintiff.87
Beever’s proposal may appear attractive for its straightforward character,
though some have criticized it as “monistic” or even “one-dimensional.”88
Nevertheless, it encounters problems of fit in relation to the features of the
unlawful means tort. Even accounting for the complex history of the economic
torts,89 this view requires a significant departure from the conventional definition
of the tort. As mentioned above, some of the earliest formulations of this tort
included the requirement of an unlawful means. More broadly, it is questionable
whether private law is committed to a principle against assertions of control per
se.90 The courts “have never fashioned a tort of undue influence,” even though
undue influence is a well-established legal concept and it is “a quintessential
instance of control as Beever defines it.”91 In any event, the “control” criterion
that he posits is arguably too vague to serve as an organizing principle of the
economic torts.92
Taking these objections further, another problem is that the indirect control
account provides no principled reason to explain why the tort is confined to
economic relations. Stevens, among other commentators, has claimed that this
limitation is irrational.93 Yet, despite opportunities to do so, the courts have
declined to extend the economic torts beyond the realm of commercial disputes.94
In Frame v Smith, for instance, Wilson J explicitly denied the existence of a
Ibid at 137.
Ibid at 131-32.
88 Izhak Englard, “Understanding Tort Law by the Kantian Moral Principle of Human Freedom,” Book
Review of A Theory of Tort Liability by Allan Beever, (2018) 9:1 J Eur Tort L 123 at 133; Zoë Sinel, “Allan
Beever’s One-Dimensional Tort Law Universe: A Review Article of Allan Beever, A Theory of Tort Liability”
(2017) 27 NZULR 807.
89 See Neyers, “Economic torts,” supra note 42 at 167.
90 See Sinel, supra note 88 at 823-826.
91 John Goldberg, Book Review of A Theory of Tort Liability by Allan Beever, (2017) 80:6 Mod L Rev 1183 at
1185.
92 Ibid.
93 Stevens, supra note 58 at 189. See also Winfield & Jolowicz, supra note 20 at para 19-028.
94 See Brandon Kain & Anthony Alexander, “The ‘Unlawful Means’ Element of the Economic Torts: Does a
Coherent Approach Lie Beyond Reach?” in Todd L Archibald & Randall Scott Echlin, eds, Annaul Review of
Civil Litigation, 2010 (Toronto: Carswell, 2010) 33 at 69.
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“generalized tort of ‘wrongful interference with another’s relationship’.” She
explained that the “common denominator of these torts is that they constitute
wrongful interference with economic relationships.”95 But if control is the underlying
rationale for the tort, presumably it should extend to all kinds of social
relationships, not only those involving an “economic interest.” 96 Apart from its
inconsistency with the unlawful means element, the control theory leaves the
tort’s domain unexplained, adding to the problems of fit.
One potential response holds that the unlawful means tort is confined to
economic relationships only because a statute has already “occupied the field” in
other, non-economic contexts.97 That is, the characterization of the tort as strictly
economic is contingent rather than necessary; at an abstract level, the tort can
properly be understood as a response to the wrongfulness of indirect control. It
is true that the majority in Frame v Smith held that any civil action relating to
custody and access in family law matters was precluded because “the Legislature
intended to devise a comprehensive scheme for dealing with these issues.” 98 It
might then be contended that the alleged problem of fit does not arise, since the
tort could have extended to non-economic relationships but for this legislative
policy.
Nevertheless, only Wilson J expressly considered the domain of the
unlawful means tort in Frame v Smith. In contrast to the majority, her refusal to
extend the tort beyond the commercial context did not appear motivated by the
presence of the legislated custody and access regime. Placing significance on the
fact that tort law “up to this point has protected only certain types of relationships
from interference,” Wilson J stated that the tort should not “be extended to a
non-economic relationship.”99 Similarly, other courts have denied the extension
of this tort to family relationships, not because of the existence of a statutory
regime, but due to the essentially different nature of parental interests in their

Frame v Smith, [1987] 2 SCR 99 at 129, Wilson J (dissenting but not on this point) [emphasis added]
[Frame]. See also Hunt v Carey Canada Inc, [1990] 2 SCR 959 at 987-88.
96 OBG, supra note 19 at para 47; AI Enterprises, supra note 25 at para 93.
97 Neyers, “Economic torts,” supra note 42 at 189 n 159.
98 Frame, supra note 95 at 111-12.
99 Ibid at 129.
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children.100 Such interests cannot be analogized to the commercial or economic
interests that the unlawful means tort protects. The indirect control theory
remains inadequate in explaining the domain of this tort. In consequence, I
conclude that Beever’s approach offers an unsatisfactory account.
Liability Stretching

In AI Enterprises, Cromwell J indicated his preference for the so-called
“liability stretching” rationale for the unlawful means tort. 101 This rationale holds
that the tort is parasitic and “extend[s] civil liability without creating new
actionable wrongs.”102 Instead of grounding a new tort liability, it “focuses on
extending an existing right to sue from the immediate victim of the unlawful act
to another party whom the defendant intended to target with the unlawful
conduct.”103 Some have observed that “liability stretching,” however, is not
actually a rationale, but a descriptive metaphor for the operation of the unlawful
means tort.104 In other words, the metaphor does not itself justify the scope and
content of the tort, though it does express certain assumptions about its
underlying normative structure.
Taken on its own terms, the “stretching” explanation is confused. Despite
the claim that the rationale reflects Lord Hoffmann’s views in OBG,105 it is
inconsistent with his description of the unlawful means tort as “a tort of primary
liability.”106 In addition, Lord Hoffmann explicitly approved Lord Lindley’s
statement in Quinn v Leatham that the rationale for the tort lies in its protection
of “a person’s liberty or right to deal with others.”107 In contrast, the liability
stretching thesis holds that the plaintiff’s cause of action against the defendant
extends, or is stretched from, the third party’s right to sue.108 This is a secondary
or accessory form of liability, which logically implies that the plaintiff should have
F v Wirral Metropolitan Borough Council, [1991] 2 WLR 1132 at 1174-75 (CA). See Bagshaw, supra note 20 at
63 n 20.
101 AI Enterprises, supra note 25 at paras 43-44.
102 Ibid at para 43.
103 Ibid at para 37.
104 Beever, ATTL, supra note 40 at 118.
105 AI Enterprises, supra note 25 at para 43.
106 OBG, supra note 19 at para 8 [emphasis added]. See Lee, supra note 35 at 561.
107 Ibid at para 46, citing Quinn v Leatham, supra note 1 at 534-35.
108 Ibid at para 37.
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no claim if the defendant’s unlawful act causes no loss to the third party. Yet, AI
Enterprises indicated that the unlawful means element encompasses not only
actionable civil wrongs, but also “conduct that would be actionable if it had
caused loss to the person at whom it was directed.”109 In that scenario, the
immediate victim has no right to sue, and therefore nothing should extend to the
plaintiff.110
Furthermore, the rationale is inconsistent with the relational nature of
liability.111 According to corrective justice, the defendant’s normative gain must
correlate to the plaintiff’s normative loss to provide a reason for liability. 112 The
parties must be the “doer and sufferer of the same injustice.”113 Liability stretching
ignores this requirement by permitting liability to arise from normative gains and
losses involving “different and distinct harms.”114 The point is aptly demonstrated
in Tarleton v M’Gawley (“Tarleton”), the very case that Cromwell J cites to illustrate
his approach. In Tarleton, the defendant obtained a normative gain by firing a
cannon at the third party canoers, who had been seeking to trade with the
plaintiff.115 This gain, in conjunction with the normative loss to the canoers’ right
to physical integrity, crystallized in the defendant’s liability for the canoers’
physical injury. In comparison, the plaintiff suffered a different normative loss in
the form of an “economic harm distinct from those physical injuries.”116 Though
Cromwell J argued that there is no reason to leave the plaintiff uncompensated,117
the liability stretching rationale cannot be rationalized within a corrective justice
framework.

Ibid at para 26.
Beever, ATTL, supra note 40 at 119; Lee, supra note 35 at 561-62.
111 See Weinrib, CJ, supra note 4 at 3.
112 Weinrib, IPL, supra note 4 at 122.
113 Weinrib, “Nutshell,” supra note 4 at 350 [emphasis added].
114 AI Enterprises, supra note 25 at para 47.
115 Tarleton v M’Gawley (1793), Peake 270, 170 ER 153.
116 AI Enterprises, supra note 25 at para 47 [emphasis added].
117 Ibid.
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THE ABUSE OF RIGHTS PROPOSAL
Unlawful Interference as Abuse of Rights

Departing from orthodox accounts that rely on policy considerations or the
immediate victim’s rights, Neyers argues that the unlawful means tort is a
manifestation of “the Kantian idea of the abuse of rights.”118 Briefly stated, the
animating idea of this account is that persons are not permitted, within a “system
of rights,” to inflict gratuitous harm upon others. Where a person deliberately
aims to “frustrate the purposes of another,” he or she thereby commits an abuse
of rights.119 These acts serve to transform rights “from markers of mutual
freedom to instruments of subordination.”120 The unlawful means tort operates
as “systematic control of the defendant’s exercise of his or her rights,” which
protects the plaintiff from interference with his or her economic relations.121
Such limitations accord with the “normative presuppositions” of a system of
rights, because rights are the juridical means by which individuals pursue their
own purposes.122 This understanding is consistent with the corrective justice
framework, insofar as it elaborates the normative incidents of a system of juridical
rights.
The defendant is properly said to have abused her right only where he or
she acts with the purpose of interfering “with the self-determining freedom of
others.”123 This suggests a plausible account of the intention element of the
unlawful means tort. Conversely, Neyers envisages a merely derivative role for
the unlawful means element. In his view, this tort is simply the “indirect/complex
form of an abuse of rights claim.”124 The paradigmatic instances of abuse of
rights, he argues, lie in the prima facie tort cases. For example, he considers Tuttle
v Buck to represent the “direct/simple form of an abusive rights claim,” where
the defendant has the predominant purpose of injuring the plaintiff and involves
Neyers, “Economic torts,” supra note 42 at 182; Neyers, “Rights-based justifications,” supra note 41 at
225.
119 Weinrib, CJ, supra note 4 at 114.
120 Neyers, “Economic torts,” supra note 42 at 183, citing Weinrib, CJ, supra note 4 at 114.
121 Ibid.
122 Weinrib, CJ, supra note 4 at 114.
123 Ibid.
124 Neyers, “Economic torts,” supra note 42 at 184.
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no intermediaries.125 The unlawful means element in the indirect form of the
claim is justified as an evidentiary device that “rebut[s] the defendant’s claim that
he or she was acting non-abusively” or without a legitimate intention.126 In effect,
the account assimilates the requirement of an unlawful means to the intention
element.
While the appeal to the idea of a system of rights is promising, the account
presented by Neyers is not without its challenges. The theory regards the unlawful
means element as redundant. In principle, the defendant’s intention to abuse his
or her right should suffice for liability. The unlawful means requirement is then
relegated to an evidentiary role.127 But the theory’s emphasis on the defendant’s
purposes then invites the objection that motive is irrelevant to liability in private
law.128 As Lord Watson stated in Allen v Flood, “the existence of a bad motive, in
the case of an act which is not in itself illegal, will not convert that act into a civil
wrong.”129 Indeed, the rejection of the prima facie tort by English and Canadian
courts underscores that an improper purpose, by itself, is not enough to found
liability.130
For this reason, it is difficult to see how the unlawful means tort can be
characterized simply as the “indirect” variant of a “direct” action for abuse of
rights. The derivative role given to unlawful means suggests a tenuous
correspondence to the actual parameters of the tort. Moreover, this theory also
inadequately explains why the tort is confined to interferences with economic
relationships. On the view advanced by Neyers, an intentional indirect
interference with any of the plaintiff’s interests—economic or otherwise—ought
to constitute, prima facie, an abuse of rights. Therefore, like the other proposals,
this account suffers from a problem of fit. It simultaneously accomplishes too
much and too little, capturing conduct that does not ordinarily give rise to tortious

Ibid at 185. See Tuttle v Buck, supra note 45.
Ibid at 184.
127 Ibid at 183. See also Neyers, “Rights-based justifications,” supra note 42 at 226.
128 Ibid at 184, 186.
129 Allen v Flood, supra note 1 at 92.
130 Cement LaFarge v BC Lightweight Aggregate, [1983] 1 SCR 452 at 469; OBG, supra note 19 at para 145; Sorrell v
Smith, [1925] AC 700 at 719 (HL (Eng)).
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liability while leaving unresolved the tort’s focus on unlawful means and
economic relationships.
Systematicity and Specification

In my view, the theory’s deficiencies of fit stem from a more fundamental
problem. Because the abuse of rights theory conceives the tort just as “systematic
control” of participants in the system of rights, it locates the gravamen of the tort
in the defendant’s improper purposes. Put differently, the notion of an ‘abuse’ is
vague, as commentators have noted;131 Neyers’ account of the tort appears to
define abuse as encompassing any act performed with an improper purpose. In
turn, it generates a justification for tortious liability whereby the prima facie tort
becomes the paradigmatic case of abuse. This approach, in essence, directly
models the parameters of the tort as a response to acting with an improper
purpose per se. Viewed in this manner, the doctrine and the limitation on the
exercise of freedoms it imposes are extrinsic to the scope and content of private
rights.
However, this conflicts with the idea that rights are, themselves, juridical
markers of freedom that define the boundaries of legally permissible conduct.132
Some have argued that abuse of right “is a juridically improper concept,” since it
expresses no more than an “absence of right, i.e. ‘no-right’ and/or ‘duty not’.”133
This objection is conceptual, for it points out that the notion of a right cannot
comfortably coexist with a duty not to abuse the right, at least at the same level
of abstraction. A right is an external, juridical manifestation of the internal
capacity for purposive action.134 If the doctrine of abuse of rights is understood
just to prohibit acting with improper motives, it undermines the concept of rights

Bruce Pardy, “Disabusing the Common Law of ‘Abuse of Rights’: The Only Legitimate Rule Redux”
(2018) 84 SCLR (2d) 201 at 215-16. Cf Grégoire CN Webber, The Negotiable Constitution: On the Limitation of
Rights (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009) at 130 (making this argument in the context of
constitutional rights).
132 Ibid at 218.
133 John Finnis, “Some Professorial Fallacies About Rights” (1972) 4:2 Adel L Rev 377 at 387 [emphasis in
original].
134 Benson, “Equality of Opportunity,” supra note 17 at 221.
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itself. The notion of an abuse “becomes normatively prior to the existence and
definition of the right, rendering the right illusory.”135
From a corrective justice perspective, this conceptual objection can be
related to the correlativity of rights and duties. Rights and duties each have
“distinct moral characters [even] while functioning together as a unity.”136
Conversely, it might be thought that a right is merely a reflex of a duty, so that
“the entire justificatory weight of the relationship rests on the reason for
considering the defendant to be under a duty.”137 Taking the defendant’s
improper purposes to constitute liability does precisely this. It frames the notion
of abuse of rights “at a level of abstraction that is too high to reflect the specific
and distinctive character of the legal relation in private law.” 138 As a result, it
superimposes the notion onto the scheme of private rights and duties in a manner
that constrains these juridical expressions of freedom, contrary to the corrective
justice approach. On that approach, rights are embodiments of the fundamental
principle “that one person’s action [must] be united with the other’s freedom in
accordance with practical reason.”139 That is, rights are conclusions to practical
reasoning, not premises subject to further considerations of “abuse”: “[a] right
gives its holder the freedom to act within its bounds.”140 Only if a right is the
product of such reasoning can it be relied upon as a “normative marker of the
parties’ relationship.”141
Accordingly, the key difficulty for the abuse of rights theory is that it is
incomplete in an important respect. In my view, the systematicity of rights should
be seen to partially constitute the scheme of rights and duties. The doctrine of
abuse of rights does not directly impose a cause of action in itself, as Neyers
suggests, so that an improper purpose alone grounds liability. Rather, abuse of
rights is akin to an organizing principle that pertains to interpersonal transactions
in a system of rights.142 As such, it still calls for a proper specification of the
Pardy, supra note 131 at 221.
Weinrib, IPL, supra note 4 at 123.
137 Ibid at 124.
138 Benson, “Equality of Opportunity,” supra note 17 at 229.
139 Weinrib, IPL, supra note 4 at 122.
140 Weinrib, CJ, supra note 4 at 89. See John Oberdiek, “Specifying Rights Out of Necessity” (2008) 28:1
Oxford J Leg Stud 127 at 135.
141 Ibid at 92.
142 See Bhasin v Hrynew, 2014 SCC 71 at para 64.
135
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defendant’s duty not to ‘abuse’ a right and, by extension, the plaintiff’s right
correlative to this duty. The right-duty relationships subsisting in private law,
then, should incorporate the normative incidents of systematicity as part of their
internal scope and content.143 Thus understood, liability would be founded on the
infringement of “rights, not purposes, which define the nature of the coexistence
the law requires.”144
If abuse of right is abstractly defined as the defendant’s deliberate
undertaking to frustrate the plaintiff’s juridical freedom, what does this entail in
the context of economic relationships, the domain peculiar to the unlawful means
tort? Once the tort is analyzed with a view to the plaintiff’s right, it shall become
clear that “the gist of the action [is] not malicious intention but violation of a legal
right committed knowingly.”145 In this manner, a refined and fully specified
account will be able to distinguish between motive, ill-will, or malice, on the one
hand, and the intention to misuse one’s means, on the other. A system of rights
refuses to legitimize an abuse of right not because the defendant acted from an
impure motive, but because she conscripted her juridical means as “instruments of
subordination.”146

EXTENDING THE ABUSE OF RIGHTS PROPOSAL
The Right to Trade

In what follows, I elaborate upon this appeal to the systematicity of rights
to provide a novel account of the unlawful means tort, which will elucidate the
tort’s compatibility with the corrective justice framework. I consider the form of
the plaintiff’s right protected by the unlawful means tort and argue that it is the
“right to trade.” Then, I discuss the content of this right as informed by corrective
justice’s account of “public right,” the condition in which private law rights are
secured by public institutions. Examining corrective justice’s conception of rights
and remedies reveals a coherent justification of the unlawful means tort, based in
See Oberdiek, supra note 140 at 128.
Pardy, supra note 131 at 218.
145 Wirral, supra note 100 at 1164.
146 Weinrib, CJ, supra note 4 at 114.
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persons’ equal status under the “juridical conception of markets,” an omnilateral
structure of impersonal relations between persons pursuing their own
purposes.147
To begin, I return to the concept of the “right to trade,” described as the
“oldest potential justification” for the unlawful means tort. 148 In Quinn v Leathem,
Lord Lindley expressed the idea that tort law protects such a right:
This liberty is a right recognised by law; its correlative is the
general duty of everyone not to prevent the free exercise of this
liberty, except so far as his own liberty of action may justify him
in so doing. But a person’s liberty or right to deal with others is
nugatory, unless they are at liberty to deal with him if they
choose to do so. Any interference with their liberty to deal with
him affects him.149
Notably, Lord Hoffmann approvingly cited this passage in OBG, describing it as
the “rationale of this tort.”150 Lord Lindley’s opinion is of particular interest
because among all the judgments in the House of Lords in Quinn v Leathem, his
distinguishes itself by its rights-based orientation. He considered it essential that
“the interference is wrongful and is intended to damage” the plaintiff, as opposed
to conduct that was “justifiable in point of law” and hence exempt from
liability.151 On the facts of the case, he found that the defendant’s actions had
“infringed the plaintiff’s rights so as to give him a cause of action.”152
Despite the apparent endorsement in OBG, some commentators object to
the existence of a right to trade. For example, Neyers argues that “it is not
conceptually possible to have a right to trade in a capitalist society (as this would
entail a duty not to compete).”153 It is important to appreciate the pedigree of this
critique. The analysis originates from Hohfeld, who criticized Lord Lindley’s
reasoning for invoking a non sequitur; he claimed it was incoherent to derive the
Ripstein, PW, supra note 4 at 177.
Neyers, “Rights-based justifications,” supra note 41 at 220.
149 Quinn v Leathem, supra note 1 at 534.
150 OBG, supra note 19 at para 46. See also Lee, supra note 35 at 561.
151 Quinn v Leathem, supra note 1 at 535.
152 Ibid at 536 [emphasis added].
153 Neyers, “Rights-based justifications,” supra note 41 at 222. See also Neyers, “Economic torts,” supra note
42 at 180.
147
148
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existence of a correlative duty from a mere liberty to deal with others.154 Whereas
Lord Lindley posited the existence of a general “duty” not to interfere, the logical
Hohfeldian correlative of a “liberty” to trade is that everyone has “no-right” to
claim that the liberty-holder cannot trade.155 Thus, it was suggested that he erred
by conflating the permission that the law gave to Leathem to carry on the trade
of butcher, with the “duty of every one not to prevent” his trade.156 The latter
formulation seems to imply that a competitor entering the marketplace could
infringe another’s right to trade by depriving his competitor of customers.157
Hence, the “right to trade” is often considered a misguided basis for the tort,
since a business owner cannot have a right to one’s customers.158
Strictly speaking, however, the Hohfeldian objection is misplaced. As
Halpin has shown, Hohfeld’s concept of a “liberty” elides the distinction between
“the absence of a duty not to do the privileged act” and “recognition and
protection by the law in doing the act.”159 The former is merely a “no-duty.” In
contrast, the latter describes a freedom to do something that is positively
protected by law.160 For example, when speaking of the “liberty” of a landowner
to enter her land, there are two possible meanings. One is that by entering, the
landowner is not in breach of a duty to anyone. The other is that the law
“positively protect[s]” the landowner’s entitlement to enter by ensuring that she
cannot be ejected for trespass.161
The operative meaning in Quinn v Leathem was the latter, since Lord Lindley
could not be taken to have asserted that Leathem had “no-duty” to trade as a
butcher. The point is that the Hohfeldian concept of a liberty is laden with a set
of underlying rights; the legal protection conferred by it “can be broken down
into a set of rights with correlative duties.”162 In spite of this, Hohfeld asserted
that it was nonsensical to correlate a duty with a liberty. That assertion would
Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, “Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning”
(1913) 23:1 Yale LJ 16 at 36-37.
155 Ibid at 36.
156 See Pierre Schlag, “How To Do Things With Hohfeld” (2015) 78:1 Law & Contemp Probs 185 at 207.
157 Ronald Podolny, “The Tort of Intentional Interference with Economic Relations: Is Clarity out of Reach?”
(2011) 52 Can Bus LJ 63 at 77.
158 See Ripstein, PW, supra note 4 at 180.
159 AKW Halpin, “Hohfeld’s Conceptions: From Eight to Two” (1985) 44:3 Camb LJ 435 at 444.
160 Ibid at 444 [emphasis added].
161 Ibid at 443.
162 Ibid at 445.
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have been correct if Lord Lindley had attempted to correlate “the general duty of
everyone” with a “no-duty” on Leathem’s part to carry on his trade.163 But he
clearly did not. The related objection, that the correlative duty must be a duty not
to deprive the plaintiff of his customers and is hence unworkable, ignores the fact
that his liberty to trade is merely a liberty to attempt to trade with others. It does
not entail that the plaintiff must be successful in his endeavours to carry on a
trade, in the sense of being commercially profitable.164
Accordingly, I argue that Lord Lindley, by referring to “a person’s liberty or
right to deal with others,” was not suggesting that the law would protect his profit
margins from other competitors. In other words, he was not declaring the
existence of a duty not to compete. Instead, in the earlier words of Bowen LJ in
Mogul Steamship, he was simply affirming that “the law recognises and encourages”
the capacity of a person to lawfully participate in the market. 165 As discussed, the
“right to trade” might simply refer to a set of protections that the law accords to
market participants, which enable them to attempt to deal with others. These
include the prohibition of certain illegitimate business practices, 166 and the scope
of protection for persons who endeavour to carry on a trade may be considered
“[t]he dividing line between lawful competition . . . and unlawful competition.”167
That is a possibility Neyers and other critics regrettably did not consider,
since they exclude the notion that the right to trade is “a measured or limited right”
that constrains certain kinds of competitive behaviour but not others. 168 The
oversight is likely motivated by Hohfeld’s all-or-nothing assumption that a liberty
must refer either to the absence of a duty on the plaintiff to carry on a trade, or
else, to the legal capacity to carry on a successful enterprise. Far from it being a
conceptual impossibility for the “liberty to trade” to be correlative to a duty, it is
eminently logical to consider whether it encompasses “a set of protecting rights”
which prevent interference with this liberty.169 In this sense, one can theorize the
Quinn v Leathem, supra note 1 at 534.
Halpin, supra note 159 at 448-49.
165 Mogul Steamship Co Ltd v McGregor, Gow & Co (1889), 23 QBD 598 at 614 (CA) [Mogul Steamship (CA)]. See
Halpin, supra note 159 at 448-49.
166 Simon Deakin & John Randall, “Rethinking the Economic Torts” (2009) 72:4 Mod L Rev 519 at 534.
167 Halpin, supra note 159 at 449.
168 Nicholas J McBride, “Rights and the Basis of Tort Law” in Donal Nolan & Andrew Robertson, eds,
Rights and Private Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2011) 331 at 339 [emphasis in original].
169 Halpin, supra note 159 at 446.
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plaintiff’s right to trade and the defendant’s correlative duty not to unlawfully
interfere, as forming the right-duty relationship that inheres in the unlawful means
tort.
The Condition of Public Right

Having dispelled the conceptual objection to the “right to trade,” it is
possible to specify this right, not merely as a reflex of the duty not to interfere
with the plaintiff’s trade, but as a distinct “juridical manifestation[ ] of the freedom
inherent in self-determining agency.”170 I contend that the legal interests and
protections underlying the right to trade may be reconciled with the corrective
justice framework through the Kantian idea of “public right.” Although Neyers
uses “public right” to denote rights created by the criminal law,171 in using this
term I invoke corrective justice’s understanding of the “public character of
private law.”172
According to Weinrib, “public right” is the “condition in which public
institutions actualize and guarantee rights.”173 The idea is that the effects of
private rights are altered once they are protected and enjoyed under public
institutions:174
public right . . . integrates these rights into a public and systematic
totality of persons, norms, and institutions, thereby moving
from bilateral relationships, in which each right (as well as its
correlative duty) stands on its own, to the omnilateral relationship
among members of a state, in which the rights and correlative
duties become constituents of a comprehensive whole.175
The two features of public right, publicness and systematicity, pertain
“respectively to the form and content of public right.” Publicness, the formal
Weinrib, IPL, supra note 4 at 122.
Neyers, “Rights-based justifications,” supra note 41 at 228; Neyers, “Economic torts,” supra note 42 at
187.
172 Weinrib, IPL, supra note 4 at 218.
173 Ernest J Weinrib, “Private Law and Public Right” (2011) 61:2 UTLJ 191 at 195 [“Public Right”].
174 Ibid at 198. See also JW Neyers, “Explaining the Inexplicable? Four Manifestations of Abuse of Rights in
English Law” in Donal Nolan & Andrew Robertson, eds, Rights and Private Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing,
2011) 309 at 310 [“Explaining the Inexplicable”].
175 Ibid at 203 [emphasis added].
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aspect of public right, refers to the condition of legal norms being known by all.
Systematicity, its substantive aspect, bears on the understanding of legal norms
and institutions as forming a systematic whole.176 Together, these features
“provide a court with a new principle of decision based on the omnilateral
standpoint of a public institution” that supplements the bilateral relationships of
corrective justice.177
It is in this condition that the notion of abuse of rights is realized.178
When private law norms are made systematic, the effect of a private right may be
extended or attenuated.179 Weinrib suggests, for example, that contractual rights
come to enjoy an in rem protection because “public right makes the contract a
juridical object for everyone” in a system of reciprocal assurance “that relates all
to all.”180 This development is thought to underpin the tort of inducing breach of
contract. It is significant, then, that Lord Lindley drew an analogy between the
unlawful means tort and the principle underlying Lumley v Gye, the case that
established the tort of inducing breach of contract.181 The general notion of abuse
of rights is similarly grounded in the omnilateral, systematic nature of public right.
Because a person is related to everyone else in this condition, systematicity
imposes requirements to uphold “the rightful form of association” of individuals,
that is, public right’s “own integrating conception of a people, of its laws, and of
its institutions.”182 Accordingly, it prohibits the anti-social act of using one’s rights
as “instruments of subordination” by purposefully inflicting gratuitous harm on
and frustrating the freedoms of another.183
The significance of public right to the unlawful means tort, I argue, lies
in the connection between the “right to trade” and a legal system’s stance against
abuse of rights. In the case of an unlawful interference with economic relations,
the defendant has committed what can be broadly characterized as an abuse of
right. But whereas Neyers’ theory sees the defendant’s wrongful purpose as the
Ibid at 196-98.
Ibid at 200.
178 Neyers, “Explaining the Inexplicable,” supra note 174 at 311.
179 Weinrib, “Public Right,” supra note 173 at 204.
180 Ibid at 205.
181 Quinn v Leathem, supra note 1 at 535, citing Lumley v Gye (1853), 118 ER 749.
182 Kant, supra note 79 at 6:306; Weinrib, “Public Right,” supra note 173 at 197.
183 Weinrib, CJ, supra note 4 at 114.
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gravamen of the tort, I suggest that the liability responds to a more specific kind
of inconsistency with public right. The effect of systematicity is not to replace the
set of juridical freedoms that prevailed prior to the condition of public right, but
rather, to add a new “layer of analysis that . . . leaves intact” those right-duty
relationships.184
In the case of the unlawful means tort, the normative implications of this
new layer derive from the form of market relations, which is only fully recognized
under public right. Like all the economic torts, this tort is oriented toward
interferences of economic and commercial relations. As I will argue, the
corrective justice approach does implicate a particular understanding of such
relations. The “juridical conception of market transactions” is a form of
omnilateral relation in which persons are entitled to use or dispose of their means
as they see fit.185 Interactions in the juridical market are impersonal, consistent
with the conception of personality that pervades private law, for within the
market everyone is influenced by everyone while “all act to pursue ends of their
own.”186 In this respect, the juridical market accords to each participant an equal
status. As persons transact impersonally and are related omnilaterally, “they all
rank equally as persons whose activities can coexist within the system of
rights.”187 To be sure, the juridical conception of the market is an abstract and
idealized image of actual market transactions, but one which is appropriate to the
juridical conception of personhood and its focus on the external manifestation of
choice.188
When the defendant employs unlawful means with the intent to utilize
the mechanisms of the market to harm the plaintiff, he has acted inconsistently
with the plaintiff’s equal status as a participant in this juridical market. The court
acknowledges this subversion of market relations as an injury correlative to the
plaintiff’s right to trade. As such, the tort responds to “the targeting of the
plaintiff by the defendant through the instrumentality of unlawful acts against a third
Weinrib, “Public Right,” supra note 173 at 205.
Ripstein, PW, supra note 4 at 176-77.
186 Weinrib, CJ, supra note 4 at 114. See also Arthur Ripstein, Equality, Responsibility, and the Law (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1998) at 251-53 [ERL].
187 Ibid.
188 Weinrib, IPL, supra note 4 at 104; Benson, “Equality of Opportunity,” supra note 17 at 211.
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party.”189 Like the form of the market itself, which is impersonal and omnilateral,
the right to trade is a product of public right that links everyone to everyone as a
specified form of the “correlative universal right” that imposes “systematic
control” against abuse of rights.190 This treatment flows from the need to uphold
the juridical conception of the market. In turn, as I shall explain, this conception
is essential to the understanding of rights and remedies under corrective justice.
Corrective Justice and the Market

Latent within corrective justice’s conception of private rights and remedies
is the idea of the omnilateral relationship that public right makes explicit. As
opposed to accounts that view a right as the mere causative event of a remedy,
corrective justice posits that a remedy is the continuation of the plaintiff’s injured
right. It accordingly conceives an award of monetary damages as restoring to the
plaintiff the quantitative form of that right.191 This “thesis of continuity” reflects
the internal coherence of a system of rights, in that at all times, the plaintiff
maintains her entitlement to possess her right, whether in its original or remedial
form.192 Like the right of which it is a continuation, a remedy expresses the law’s
“concern for equal liberty and security for all.”193
According to the continuity thesis, the substance of the remedy is seen as
the same as that of the underlying right. Since rights are juridical means by which
a person can pursue her purposes externally in the world, the remedy must have
a similarly external manifestation.194 This provides an answer to the objection, for
instance, that a mere apology by the defendant could satisfy the remedial demands
of corrective justice.195 An apology, being solely a reflection of a defendant’s
inward, subjective state, would not restore to the plaintiff her injured right since
it does not restore the external means that she lost.196 By setting aside such
AI Enterprises, supra note 25 at para 78 [emphasis added].
Neyers, “Economic torts,” supra note 42 at 184.
191 Weinrib, CJ, supra note 4 at 94, 98.
192 Ibid at 92-93. See also Ernest J Weinrib, “Causal Uncertainty” (2016) 36:1 Oxford J Legal Stud 135 at 14445.
193 Ripstein, ERL, supra note 186 at 49.
194 Weinrib, CJ, supra note 4 at 93.
195 Perry, “Conceptions,” supra note 7 at 36. See also Stephen R Perry, “The Moral Foundations of Tort
Law” (1992) 77 Iowa L Rev 449 at 494.
196 Weinrib, CJ, supra note 4 at 91-93; Ripstein, PW, supra note 4 at 252.
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internal considerations, private law embraces terms of interaction that recognize
the parties as free and equal in respect of their juridical personality.197
Monetary damages are an appropriate way to restore what the plaintiff has
lost, because money is the “universal means by which men exchange their
industriousness with one another.”198 Put differently, the corrective justice theory
perceives the violation of a private right to be wrongful because rights are
“juridical markers of the freedom” to pursue one’s ends or projects in the
world.199 When rights are violated, the plaintiff is deprived of the external means
by which he can pursue his ends; money substitutes for and remedies the injured
right by restoring to the plaintiff those means. As discussed above, for corrective
justice, there is an equivalence between the right and the remedy, insofar as both
embody a person’s “self-determining freedom.”200 The equivalence of means and
money follows, because money is the universal form of value, which can be
exchanged for almost any other means.201 In this way, damages reflect private
law’s mode of social ordering, based on fair terms of interaction.202
An important postulate of this system of remedies is the idea of a market.
Corrective justice posits an equivalence between right and remedy, as well as the
effectiveness of monetary damages as a remedy. From this perspective, such
damages must be capable of serving as substitutes for one’s means.203 If a sum of
money could not be assimilated to one’s external means and used to further one’s
purposes, such as by being exchanged for external acquisitions, the remedy could
not truly restore the plaintiff’s right. Such a situation would be inconsistent with
the condition of public right, which purports to ensure that rights are public,
systematic, and enforceable.204 In order to do so, a juridical idea of the market
must be inherent in the system of rights, since the remedy, money, must be
capable of being converted to other means of equivalent value. This attributes to
the remedy an objective existence, similar to the right of which it is another
Benson, “Equality of Opportunity,” supra note 17 at 219.
Arthur Ripstein, Force and Freedom: Kant’s Legal and Political Philosophy (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 2009) at 305. See also Ripstein, ERL, supra note 186 at 58.
199 Weinrib, “Public Right,” supra note 173 at 193.
200 Weinrib, CJ, supra note 4 at 87.
201 Ripstein, PW, supra note 4 at 252.
202 See Ripstein, ERL, supra note 186 at 49.
203 Weinrib, CJ, supra note 4 at 95.
204 See ibid at 110-12.
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form.205 Valuation, in turn, depends on the existence of a “community of
exchange,” in the form of the market.206
The relevant conception of the market expresses the juridical personality of
the transacting individuals.207 In the condition of public right, the abstraction
from persons’ needs, wishes, or advantage intrinsic to the juridical standpoint
takes on a new, constitutive dimension. Under a system of rights, this abstraction
has a universalizing character, in that all participants are reciprocally and formally
related to one another. They are taken to exist and interact together in a form of
civil society, in virtue of their common possession of wants and needs, though
each person’s particular wants and needs are different.208 That is, the fact that
abstract persons transact with one another to satisfy their particular, concrete
needs constitutes the juridical market as a purely horizontal ordering of
interpersonal relations. As part of this ordering, they recognize themselves “as
persons with particular and separate interests that they viewed as their own and
wanted to pursue.”209 As such, the juridical conception of markets has both an
impersonal and omnilateral feature. It is a distinctive normative space, a
“universality appropriate to the relations between concrete persons pursuing their
separate interests and particular ends.”210
This market is an abstract, universalizing form of relations immanent in
public right. Given the equivalence between money and means that corrective
justice posits, the market can itself be considered as a kind of means for the
pursuit of one’s purposes. Tort law, supplemented by considerations of
systematicity, serves to uphold this mode of ordering. In this manner, public right
informs the content of the “right to trade.” When a person deliberately targets
another “through the instrumentality of unlawful acts against a third party,”211
she imperils this mode of ordering. This act implicates the plaintiff’s right to trade,
which embodies a relation of status as an equal participant under this conception
See ibid at 198.
See Jean-Philippe Deranty, “Hegel’s Social Theory of Value” (2005) 36:3 The Philosophical Forum 307 at
310.
207 See Ripstein, PW, supra note 4 at 177.
208 See GWF Hegel, Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, translated by TM Knox (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1952) at §192.
209 John Rawls, Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000) at 345.
210 Ibid at 346 [emphasis added].
211 AI Enterprises, supra note 25 at para 78.
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of markets. Public right attributes to everyone an equal status to participate in the
juridical market and refuses to legitimize acts that deliberately frustrate the
operation of the market.
From this status flows certain rights and duties, which reflect the fair terms
of interaction under its form of private ordering. In Lord Lindley’s words, the
impersonal form of market relations entails a person’s “liberty to earn his own
living in his own way, provided he did not violate some special law prohibiting
him from so doing, and provided he did not infringe the rights of other
people.”212 This statement captures two features essential to the juridical
conception of markets. These two rationales underpin the right to trade, a right
that applies equally to all and places a party, as Bowen LJ stated, “at no special
disadvantage as compared with others.”213 First, as discussed, market relations are
impersonal. Persons participate in the market to exchange their means, and their
particular, separate, inward purposes are relevant only insofar as each person’s
means are a proxy for those purposes.
Second, persons must be able to enjoy their holdings, proprietary and
contractual, securely. This presupposes that persons can engage in commercial
relations against a general background of lawful interaction. As Deakin and
Randall note, the market is embedded in rules of the common law.214 For
instance, private law recognizes the freedom that owners of property have “to
enjoy the bargaining position that another’s preferences independently produce,”
but not to any specific object of their desires or to exercise jurisdiction over the
means of another.215 The valuation of means, and the effectiveness of a remedy,
that corrective justice presupposes are only possible where persons’ holdings and
transactions are made reliably secure under a public regime of laws. The unlawful
means tort responds to an attempt to subvert the terms of fair interaction. It
prevents a defendant from exploiting the omnilateral form of the market, by

Quinn v Leathem, supra note 1 at 534.
Mogul Steamship (CA), supra note 165 at 614.
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injuring a third party, to deny others the equal freedom to pursue their purposes
and ends.216
Equality of Opportunity and the Right to Trade

As a matter of public right, a court preserves rights and remedies as markers
of freedom by upholding the form of relations appropriate to the market. In my
view, the protection of the integrity of the juridical market is the justification for
the unlawful means tort. A person who commits an independently actionable
wrong against a third party, with the intention to target another, disrupts this
mode of social ordering. The systematicity of a condition of public right attributes
to each person an equal status to participate in the juridical market. When the
cause of action is established, the court awards damages commensurate to the
plaintiff’s economic injury, which restores to her the factual, pecuniary incidents
of the right that she had lost. In this sense, everyone has an equal opportunity to
utilize and exchange one’s means in the pursuit of her own purposes. The right
to trade embodies that status and is correlative to a duty not to abuse the right, a
duty “to leave them in the undisturbed enjoyment of their liberty of action.”217
As such, it is not a “classically delineated” private right—a right to one’s
reputation, bodily integrity, or property—but a right with a public element.218
This proposed account of the unlawful means tort does not imply acceptance of
a prima facie tort. It is not founded on the unjustified infliction of economic loss,
but rather, the interference with the equal status of juridical persons under public
right. In truth, the imposition of liability to uphold rights with public elements is
not unknown to private law. The common law has long acknowledged the
existence of a “law of the realm,” which imposes duties on members of certain
professions toward the public.219 For example, the “common calling” cases and

See Ripstein, PW, supra note 4 at 171.
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cases involving property “affected with a public interest,” fall within this category,
articulating qualifications on the scope of private rights.220
Such duties are not strictly contractual, but “are akin to obligations which
flow from assuming a status.”221 In the case of a common calling, the profession
is non-associational in nature, in that it is “constituted around transactions with
abstract customers,” or customers who are not conceptualized in terms of their
personal characteristics. As Reichman argues, certain professions, such as
innkeepers and common carriers, by their nature cannot simply pick and choose
their customers. They hold themselves out as serving the general public, carrying
on business in an impersonal manner.222 The ideal of publicness and orientation
toward an abstract customer is a constitutive, and not merely regulative, feature
of those professions. Just as membership in a profession entails status-based
obligations, the juridical market confers an equal status on all participants, which
gives rise to the right to trade.
By protecting this status, the unlawful means tort can be said to protect a
kind of equality of opportunity. In this vein, it has been suggested that the tort
operates to delineate the boundaries between legitimate and illegitimate
competition, thereby “maintain[ing] the integrity of the competitive process.”223
From the juridical standpoint, however, the tort’s function is basic and formal, as
opposed to substantive. In my view, it simply ensures that persons are afforded
an equal opportunity to endeavour to carry on trade or business within a structure
of “basic standards of civilised behaviour in economic competition” that, 224 at
least from the perspective of private law, secures for everyone a means of
impersonal exchange. No person can employ unlawful means to deprive another
of their status, or formal opportunity to participate in the market. The rights and
duties accruing from a status are not purely private, in that they do not arise as a
normative incident of juridical personality alone.225 The right to trade considers
persons “as members of civil society, that individuals are recognized as vested
Amnon Reichman, “Property Rights, Public Policy and the Limits of the Legal Power to Discriminate” in
Dan Friedmann, ed, Human Rights in Private Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2001) 245 at 248-52.
221 Reichman, “Professional Status,” supra note 219 at 81, 117.
222 Ibid at 115, 118 [internal quotation marks omitted].
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with this equal right.”226 In other words, it presupposes the existence of a
collectivity, or the “integrating conception of a people” under public right.227
Despite this quasi-public dimension, the unlawful means tort provides a basis for
formal equality of opportunity that is ultimately compatible with the theory of
corrective justice.228

APPLYING THE ABUSE OF RIGHT THEORY
Unlawful Means

Because the juridical market constitutes an omnilateral relationship between
persons, rather than between the individual and the state, the right to trade
pertains only to interpersonal wrongs. In consequence, the right to trade is
implicated only when a person’s capacity to independently pursue her purposes
is interfered with by an independently actionable wrong. In this manner, the
justification for the unlawful means tort differs somewhat from the “fair
competition” rationale advanced by others. Kain and Alexander, for instance,
analogize the market to a “game” where liability is imposed for “cheating” the
competitive rules.229 Although the market and a “game” might resemble each
other, the latter is different in that it presupposes the existence of a higher norm,
above the players, that governs fair play. The relationship between the putative
player and the notional authority that determines “the rules of a game,” 230 such
as an umpire or the Competition Bureau, is vertical and bilateral, rather than
horizontal and omnilateral. The “cheating” theory of the tort, then, only
approximates the form of relations constituted by public right.
As Cromwell J has also noted, “[i]f the primary purpose of the tort were to
uphold the institution of market competition, it would be irrelevant whether the
interference was intentional or negligent,” since presumably, parties could
unknowingly engage in anti-competitive or externality-creating behaviour.231 On
Weinrib, “Public Right,” supra note 173 at 197; Benson, “Equality of Opportunity,” supra note 17 at 234.
Weinrib, “Public Right,” supra note 173 at 197.
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my proposed account, the tort has a less ambitious role. Tortious liability is not
responsive to the internal needs or wishes of competitors, nor to the
maximization of market competition. Rather, it simply ensures a formal
opportunity to transact as a juridical person equal in standing to others. In
contrast, if the fair competition rationale were accepted, it would be
counterproductive to maintain the intention element of the tort. To do so would
generate the seemingly perverse result that “a defendant will be protected from
liability by his own ignorance . . . or even stupidity.”232 On the grounds of fit and
coherence, these considerations militate against the view that the economic torts
serve to optimize the competitive features of the market.233
Moreover, to broaden the unlawful means element beyond the requirement
of an interpersonal wrong would potentially assimilate private law disputes to
distributive functions. Such an approach is contrary to the corrective justice
understanding of private law adjudication. As the Privy Council aptly observed in
a conflict of laws case:
All the provisions of Municipal Statutes for the regulation of
trade and trading companies are presumably enacted in the
interest and for the benefit of the community at large; and
persons who violate these provisions are, in a certain sense,
offenders against the state law, as well as against individuals who
may be injured by their misconduct.234
Thus, much of the regulation of competition belongs to the distributive function
of the legislature, which acts for the community. Recognition of this difference
between common law and legislated rights explains the concerns about
“tortifying” the criminal law. Lord Hoffmann, for example, warned of creating
liability for “something which is wrongful for reasons which have nothing to do
with the damage inflicted on the claimant,” and hence is not an interpersonal
wrong.235
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It may be tempting to object that it is “passing strange that a breach of
contract should be proscribed but not a crime” under the unlawful means tort.236
However, this argument erroneously presupposes that any criminal activity is
more wrongful than an actionable civil wrong. To the contrary, conduct is often
proscribed by the criminal law on the basis of a legislative judgment made from
“a general social perspective,” that is to say, a perspective of distributive justice.237
While the unlawful means tort is confined to economic relationships, it is not
concerned with distributive purposes.
As I have argued, the underlying justification of the unlawful means tort is
that it secures to each person their equal status in the juridical market, which is
constituted by public right. The community of interaction constituted by public
right is an interpersonal ordering that “relates each person to every other
person.”238 The requirement that the unlawful means be visited upon a third party
reflects the tort’s purpose, which is to respond to an attempt to undermine this
omnilateral form of relations through the mechanisms of the market itself. The
narrow scope given to the unlawful means element accords with this account.
Since public right adds, but does not substitute, “a new principle of decision” or
a “layer of analysis” to private rights,239 it does not purport to expand the scope
of tortious liability on the basis of distributive considerations. Those
considerations, which are extrinsic to the relations between the subjects of public
right, are the domain of the legislature rather than the court.
Intention

At the same time, it is insufficient for liability that an independently
actionable wrong occurs to the third party. Unless a defendant determines to
target the plaintiff, a violation of the right to trade has not occurred, because it
cannot be said that he has transformed the structure of the market into an
instrument of subordination.240 The abuse of rights theory views the subversion
of the plaintiff’s equal status in the market as the wrong. Because the juridical
Ibid at para 152.
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market is an ordering of impersonal relations, the plaintiff’s right protects her
status to transact impersonally with others, without their regard for her particular
purposes or identity. For this reason, liability only accrues where the defendant
possesses the intention to target the plaintiff. In employing unlawful means
against a third party with this intention, the defendant has singled out the plaintiff
in a manner inconsistent with the impersonal quality of the juridical market: the
defendant acts to visit harm upon this particular person.
Seen in this light, the account supports Lord Hoffmann’s distinction in OBG
“between ends, means and consequences.”241 The wrongfulness of the
defendant’s action is found not in any personal animus against the plaintiff, but
rather in the commitment to the purpose of striking at him; mere negligence or
foreseeability of loss does not posit an inconsistency between the defendant’s
freedom and the right to trade of others.242 Indeed, since corrective justice
understands liability as a response to an interpersonal wrong, the identity of the
particular plaintiff and defendant are always relevant. In this sense, it is coherent
to theorize the intention element as involving the targeting of a specific,
identifiable person.243 As Beever suggests, it is not that “the defendant must target
the harm to the plaintiff . . . [but] that the defendant must target the plaintiff”
through the unlawful means.244 The existence of this intention can be determined
objectively, by asking whether it manifests to a reasonable person a singling out
of the plaintiff. Furthermore, because the element of intentionality does not
require “balancing” the public utility of the defendant’s act against the plaintiff’s
interests, the imposition of liability is judicial and not legislative.245
On this account, it is apparent that the role of the intention element is
neither a remoteness-bridging device nor an ingredient of liability stretching. It
does not prop up a cause of action for an existing wrong, so to speak, but forms
part of the defendant’s wrongful conduct against the plaintiff itself. A full
appreciation of Lord Lindley’s reasons in Quinn v Leathem supports this refined
view. He stated that if the plaintiff “is wrongfully and intentionally struck at through
OBG, supra note 19 at para 62.
See Ripstein, PW, supra note 4 at 171.
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others,” the “damage is not remote or unforeseen.”246 But while Stilitz and Sales
relied on this statement to justify their theory, the passage in Quinn v Leathem in
fact emphasizes the plaintiff’s rights:
. . . the whole aspect of the case is changed: the wrong done to
others reaches him, his rights are infringed although indirectly, and
damage to him is not remote or unforeseen, but is the direct
consequence of what has been done.247
Read more fully, it strongly suggests he held that remoteness was overcome by
reason of the infringement of the right, rather than intention alone. Of course,
this approach is consistent with the account based on the right to trade.
Incidentally, this understanding of the tort explains its confinement to the
domain of economic relationships. The right to trade is an embodiment of the
plaintiff’s equal status under the juridical conception of markets. In the case of
family or social relationships, the persons involved do not relate to each other as
abstract individuals, but as individuals with particular desires and ends. Such
relationships cannot properly be characterized as omnilateral or impersonal.
Therefore, no breach of the right to trade can be invoked in these contexts. The
significance of the commercial context also provides good reason to believe that
Lord Hoffmann was correct to be especially concerned “not only with the legal
quality of the unlawful means . . . but also with their effect in interfering with a third
party’s freedom of economic action.”248 In contrast, Cromwell J dismissed the relevance
of this “freedom to deal” qualification because he perceived it purely as an
instrument to limit the scope of the tort; he considered that the unlawful means
element sufficed to limit liability.249 Although it has been criticized as irrelevant
to “the rationale for imposing liability,” the rights-based theory of the tort offered
here accounts for the role of the “freedom to deal” element.250
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CONCLUSION
This paper has argued that a fuller specification of the abuse of rights theory
provides a coherent account of the tort of unlawful interference with economic
relations, and moreover, that the tort is compatible with corrective justice. From
that perspective, the tort appeared to be problematic due to the unclear role of
the plaintiff’s right, the predominant focus on the defendant’s purposes, and the
suggestion that it reflects considerations of distributive justice. Having reviewed
various proposed justifications for the tort, I contended that the most promising
approach was the abuse of rights theory and its invocation of the idea of a system
of rights. This paper developed the conception of public right, remedies, and the
juridical market in order to fully specify the right underlying the tort.
In virtue of the continuity of rights and remedies, a juridical conception of
markets is immanent in the corrective justice outlook. The unlawful means tort
protects the plaintiff’s right to trade, a right flowing from a person’s equal status
in the juridical market. On this account, it is evident that the tort does, in fact,
accord with the normative presuppositions of corrective justice. First, the right
to trade underlies the triangular form of the tort, since it responds to the
defendant’s wrong against the plaintiff and not a third party. Second, the rightduty relationship that inheres in the tort is consistent with the correlative nature
of liability. The defendant’s intention to target, or single out, the plaintiff through
the instrumentality of a third party forms an articulated unity with the plaintiff’s
capacity to transact impersonally in the condition of public right. Finally, this
account justifies the scope of the unlawful means element on the basis of norms
of horizontal ordering, rather than on considerations of distributive justice. It is
submitted, then, that corrective justice does contain the normative resources to
explain the tort of unlawful interference with economic relations.

